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ABSTRACT: In my opinion, Richard Moran’s account of the connections between self-knowledge and intentional ac-
tion presents a certain unresolved tension. On the one hand, the epistemic privilege of the first person de-
rives from the fact that forming an intention is a matter of the subject endorsing a course of action. An en-
dorsing subject is not a mere observer of her intentions. On the other hand, the transparency of endorse-
ment is assimilated to the putative fact that an agent forms her intentions by reflecting on the reasons to 
make up her mind. The resulting picture is an extremely rationalistic account of intentional action. I will try 
to defend that this form of practical rationalism can be avoided without renouncing the basic intuitions be-
hind Moran’s use of the notion of endorsement.  
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In my opinion, Moran’s account (Authority and Estrangement) of the first-person way of 
knowing our own intentions presents a certain unresolved tension. I would say that it 
is the consequence of the strong assimilation he constantly makes between reasons for 
believing and reasons for action. The tension I have in mind is the result of two con-
flicting and, in the end, incompatible images. According to Moran, the epistemic privi-
lege of the first person derives from the fact that forming an intention is a matter of 
the subject endorsing a course of action. An endorsing subject is not a mere observer 
of her intentions. On the other hand, endorsement is conceptualized as a matter of 
accepting certain reasons as good reasons to act. The resulting picture is an extremely 
rationalistic account of intentional action: a kind of account that, to be fair, is com-
mon to many other contemporary, anti-Humean accounts.  
 Whatever the problems for this overall picture are, the particular strategy that 
Moran follows seems to force him to accept the conclusion that any case of action 
against the agent’s best reasons —or the reasons the agents thinks are her best rea-
sons— is a case in which the agent’s self-knowledge is impaired. As a general principle 
this does not seem to be true. I can calmly and lucidly decide to eat a chocolate cake 
against my best reasons without any obvious deficiency in my self-knowledge. In fact, 
I do think that Moran’s overall use of the notion of endorsement does give him an ex-
cellent tool both to explain self-knowledge and to distance himself from the extremely 
rationalistic picture of intentional action that is common to many other contemporary 
accounts (Nagel, Quinn, Foot, Scanlon, Brandom). To do that, it would be better, in 
my opinion, to revise some of the connections he makes between endorsing a course 
of action and acting for reasons.  
I 
Moran, as many other philosophers, takes for granted that intentional action (or nor-
mal, full intentional action) is action for reasons. And uses this notion of reason (i) in a 
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full normative sense and, also, (ii) as the crucial notion to explain the first person epis-
temic privilege on her intentions.  
 The description under which the action is intentional gives the agent’s primary reason in so 
acting, and the agent knows this description in knowing his primary reason. This description is 
known by him because it is the description under which he conceives of it in his practical reason-
ing. It is the description under which the action is seen as choice worthy, as aiming to some good 
to be achieved... 
 It is an expression of the authority of reason here that he can and must answer the question 
of his belief or action by reflection on the reasons in favor of this belief or action. (pp. 126-7)  
 I think that this fully Anscombean conception of intentional action crucially 
equivocates on the meaning of “reasons in favor of action”. In my opinion, the 
Anscombe-Moran principle that intentional action requires a “primary reason” could 
only be true under a teleological reading of “reason”: to specify such a reason is just to 
specify the purpose, the goal of the action. By itself, this notion of primary reason 
does not guarantee any kind of relevant justification: it has nothing to do with consid-
ering that the goal is “choice worthy” or “good”. Much confusion in contemporary 
literature is linked to this crucial equivocation: in the sense in which it is true that (full) 
intentional action is action for reasons, the term “reasons” is used in a very particular 
sense. And by connecting reasons with intentional action in this sense, you are offer-
ing an elucidation of a very particular sense of “reason”, more than an elucidation of 
the notion of intentional action. You cannot take for granted that you are using an in-
dependent notion of reason, a notion that can clarify the notion of intention.  
 In my opinion, then, Moran’s account can be described as one more instance of a 
certain trend in current anti-Humean literature. While he is right in the assumption 
that (normally) our own pro-attitudes are not reasons for action, he misinterprets the 
data that seem to support the idea that intentional action is action for reasons. Cer-
tainly, our own pro-attitudes are not normative reasons for action. Normally, our rea-
sons for action are the content of certain pro-attitudes: certain fact-like entities, state 
of affairs, properties…1 But you cannot combine this intuition with a conjunctive ac-
count of the phenomenon of motivation. To be moved by certain facts, or by the 
prospect of certain (possible) state of affairs, cannot be conceptualized as the conjunc-
tion of having a reason and being moved by it. This is an illusion that I call the 
“Davidsonian” or the “conjunctive” illusion. Motivation does not require the double 
phenomenon of recognizing some reason for action, and being moved in the relevant 
way by it.  
                                                     
1 I say “normally” because an important fact, that is misinterpreted by Humean accounts, is that many 
times the fact that we have a certain kind of desire does give us a reason to satisfy it. This is not what 
the Humean needs: in those cases, our reason is not the fact that we desire, but certain objective rela-
tion between the satisfaction of our desire and certain independent good (our well being, for in-
stance).  
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II 
A good starting point is to try to describe a certain shared ground between Moran and 
me regarding the mistakes we attribute to our common opponent —the philosopher 
who defends a Humean theory of motivation. I certainly agree that, from the specific 
direction of fit that is proper to desires, you cannot get the Humean conclusion that 
desires are reasons for action. Even conceding that any case of intentional action can 
be explained by mentioning certain dispositions that have the direction of fit that is 
proper to desires, we still need an argument that could show that those dispositions 
are reasons. Why should they be conceived as reasons at all? Why are they states in 
which the world must fit, as M. Smith has said?2 In the sense in which, let’s say, any 
disposition is supposed to be a state in which the world must fit? Nobody can seriously 
argue that there is a sense of “reason” in which dispositions are reasons for their rele-
vant displays, or that the world must fit in them.  
 Now, there is what seems to me a mistaken reaction to this flaw in the Humean 
account: just to assume that the apparent reason-providing role of desires must be 
guaranteed by the fact that we can only desire what we consider desirable, worthy, 
good…3 Obviously, if this were the case, then we would reach a quite comfortable 
position: we could concede that desires play a crucial role in rationalizating intentional 
action, without conceding that desires are reasons. Desires could always (minimally) 
rationalize the formation of our intentions, just because desires would require the pre-
vious recognition of a minimal (normative) reason to desire the desired object. I do 
not think this is right: the obvious fact that a desire is not a simple disposition, does 
not ground the conclusion that a desire is a disposition for something that is consid-
ered as worthy. And the source of this illusion is connected to the Humean illusion 
about the role of desires in rationalizations of action.  
 Of course, desires can be mentioned in rationalizations of action. Facts and beliefs 
can also be so mentioned. In those rationalizations, we fix certain reasons the agent 
has. But they are a very special kind of reasons. By saying this, I am not accepting 
common, standard Humean conceptions about “motivating”, as opposed to norma-
tive, reasons. The standard ways of introducing the distinction only justify the differ-
ence between having a reason and being in fact (minimally) motivated by it.4 This can 
hardly count as a difference between two different kinds of reasons. On the contrary, 
in the sense of “reason” in which intentional action always requires acting for reasons, 
those reasons are just the content of the intention with which we act. Nothing more. 
They are not normative reasons to be motivated. They are not the fact that we are 
motivated. Even if having those reasons is being motivated in the relevant way by them, 
they are not the fact that we are in a certain motivational state. They are the content of 
certain motivational states. In fact, this is a teleological, very special, sense of “rea-
                                                     
2 Cf. M. Smith, 1994, p. 116. 
3 Recently, this has been explicitly argued by Quinn and Scanlon. It is obviously implicit in Anscombe’s 
Intention, and in Moran’s own book.  
4 Cfr. M. Smith, 1987. 
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son”. You cannot have those reasons, without those reasons guiding in fact your be-
haviour. They are generated by the mere fact that certain descriptions of our inten-
tional action are better than others, insofar as they fix certain aspects under which our 
action was intended.  
 The grain of truth behind the idea that intentional action is (normally) action for 
reasons, is that intentional action accepts certain paradigmatic why-questions, ques-
tions that ask the agent to specify the content of the intention-with-which she acts. To 
avoid useless terminological discussions we can call reasons in this sense “CS Rea-
sons”: content-specifying-reasons. (By calling them “CS Reasons” I am neither assum-
ing nor denying, to start with, that they have all the features that Anscombe and 
Moran would attribute to their “primary reasons”. I am just assuming that they are the 
kind of reasons that are always present in intentional action.) In a crucial aspect, I 
guess, Moran and me, we are both in the same side: those CS reasons are not pro-
attitudes of the agent (they are not her desires and/or her beliefs). They are features of 
the world —even in some extraordinary cases they can also be psychological features 
of the world. What does not follow, pace Moran and many other anti-Humean ac-
counts, is that CS reasons are necessarily justificatory in any interesting and practical 
sense: normally their only justificatory role is to refine the description of the intention 
with which the agent acts: an intention can be re-described by appealing to certain CS 
reasons. On the very same grounds on which Moran is prepared to argue against 
many approaches to intentional action (Davidsonian, Humean) that accept that any 
proper case of intention requires independent pro-attitudes that are the reasons for 
which the agent acts, we must also defend that the reasons for which an agent acts (in-
sofar as normal intentional action requires such reasons) do not have the role of justi-
fying the agent when she makes her mind up. For those reasons are just the content of 
her decision. 
 To see this, let’s consider the following answers to a typical why-question that an 
honest and knowledgeable agent might give, when asked by a friend in Girona station, 
to explain his presence there:  
(1) I have the intention of going to Barcelona tomorrow. 
(2) I am buying a train ticket because I have the intention of going to Barcelona 
tomorrow. 
(3) I am buying a train ticket because I want to go to Barcelona tomorrow. 
(4) I am buying a ticket for tomorrow’s train to Barcelona because I have just 
remembered that tomorrow is the last day of the Caravaggio’s exhibition in 
Barcelona. 
(5) I am buying a ticket for tomorrow’s train to Barcelona because I have always 
desired to see Caravaggio’s painting. 
(6) I am buying a ticket for tomorrow’s train to Barcelona because I have read 
that tomorrow’s is the last day of Caravaggio’s exhibition. 
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(7) I am buying a ticket for tomorrow’s train to Barcelona because Caravaggio’s 
exhibition is worth seeing. 
 I guess, it is obvious that, in the sense in which (1)-(3) specify a reason for action, 
the specified reason is just the content of the intention. (1) is an avowal of intention 
and I am prepared to happily accept most of what Moran says about the special, im-
mediate, non observational knowledge of my intention. Look at (2) and (3). Moran 
would accept, I guess, that the very same kind of non observational knowledge is 
normally present here, regarding the true reason why I buy the ticket —my going to 
Barcelona, instead, for instance, of my going away from a nasty visitor at home. There 
is an even deeper agreement here: Moran would agree with me (see his discussion on 
what he calls “justificatory” reasons) that the true reason for my buying the ticket is, at 
least normally, not my having previously formed an intention of going to Barcelona, it 
is the content of this previous intention. In (2) and (3), in a normal context, the rele-
vant reason why I buy the ticket is just the (content of the) intention with which I buy 
the ticket, the purpose, the goal, of my buying the ticket. The mechanism of avowing 
one’s intention with the language of “I want...” (3) is quite common. In those contexts 
“because I want to...” seems to work as a teleological connective: it specifies the inten-
tion with which the agent acts, the goal aimed at by her action.  
 Cases (4)-(7) might look quite different. In them, a reference to the pro-attitudes or 
some intrinsic value seems to work as a way of specifying the reasons why the agent 
acts. There are of course certain differences, but, in my opinion they are systematically 
misunderstood in contemporary literature. It is true that (5) can be a conversationally 
appropriate answer to a paradigmatic why-question (“Why are you going to the sta-
tion?”). The Humean is obviously impressed by (i) the fact that a similar answer —an 
answer that mentions desires, for instance— is always possible and (ii) the fact that 
desires seem obviously appropriate to explain behaviour —the “direction of fit” intui-
tion. Moran says that the explanatory role of desires is not the relevant issue when we 
think in the reasons why we intentionally act: even if my desire causes my intention, 
the fact that I desire is not, at least not normally, my reason to act. And I agree. He 
would insist that in the relevant sense of “reason” in which we have an immediate, 
non observational knowledge of the reasons why we act, this knowledge cannot be 
explained by observation of a causal link between desires and intention/action. And I 
agree too —of course, this does not mean that there is no kind of causal link between 
desires and action.  
 It might seem that (5) is an appropriate answer to the typical why-question that 
asks for the reasons why we act. The diagnosis is quite simple: (5) is a perfectly appro-
priate way of conveying the relevant information about those reasons (the SC Rea-
sons). But not because my desires are those reasons. It is because the agent is exploit-
ing her conversational commitment to provide relevant information. She is just talking 
about the special causal antecedents of the action that are internally linked to the pur-
pose that guides her. There are millions of causal antecedents of the action that might 
be mentioned, and that are, nevertheless, quite irrelevant for the information that has 
to be provided. By choosing this particular causal antecedent, the honest agent con-
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veys information about the relevant kind of reasons she is being asked for: the CS rea-
sons that fix the content of her intention. So we can nicely extend the kind of non ob-
servational, immediate knowledge that is proper to pure avowals to the first person 
knowledge of the relation that is introduced by “because” in (5). This knowledge is 
not derived from a previous knowledge of the causal antecedents, it is because the 
agent knows her intentions that she can mention —among the many causal antece-
dents— one that conveys the content of the intention to the audience.  
 I do not think that Moran would object to anything I say in the previous para-
graph. Otherwise, I do not see how he could argue against the thesis that (5) provides 
relevant information about the intention because it mentions a certain pro-attitude 
that is the reason for which the subject acts. Be that as it may, there is a crucial test in 
favour of my approach. Compare, now, (4), (5) and (6). According to most standard 
views about what is literally said, we can assume that they are not avowals, at all. And, 
as Davidson saw, the fact that I have had certain desires or that I have read something 
in a newspaper can hardly count as a reason that is necessarily effective. I could have 
had the desire without being moved in the relevant way by it. On the other hand we 
have the intuition that they are standard ways of conveying the intention, the goal, the 
purpose with which the agent acts. Both things are true. We can say that there is 
mechanism of conversational implicature by which the agent conveys her intention 
just by selecting as relevant a certain causal antecedent of the action. Our intuition that 
(4), (5) and (6) are ways of conveying CS Reasons goes hand by hand with our intui-
tion that the agent tries to use this conversational mechanism. The crucial test is: if the 
agent cancels the corresponding conversational implicature, then we are forced to stop assuming that 
(4), (5) and (6) convey information about the relevant CS reasons. It is not only that the men-
tioned pro-attitudes are not the reasons for which the agent acted. It is that we loose 
any obvious right to consider them reasons in favour of what the agent is doing. For 
instance, the agent might add to (6):  
Even so, I do not go to Barcelona with the intention of visiting the exhibition. I go there because 
I promised to my mother (who knows how much I like Caravaggio) that I will visit her before the 
end of the exhibition.  
 By doing this, she is not contradicting herself. Simply she has cancelled any right to 
assume that the intention was to visit the exhibition. And when this is true, we cannot 
assume that the desire of visiting the exhibition is a reason to do what she tries to do.5
                                                     
5 It is important to see that I am not begging the issue against the Humean. He cannot say that I must 
show that the desire to visit the exhibition is not —still— a reason to visit it. For this is something 
that I do not necessarily deny. Sometimes, our desires can be reasons: when, given that we have the 
desire, its satisfaction is a good thing. That obviously depends on the kind of desire. Remember the 
dialectical setting of the previous paragraphs: the point here is that it is the Humean who needs to 
show that the universal possibility of mentioning desires as dispositions that rationalize actions gives 
those dispositional-like entities the status of reasons. Without this further move, he can only rely on 
the “direction of fit” argument. It is this necessary, complementary move what the present argument 
tries to block.  
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 How does the first personal, privileged knowledge about our intentions depend on 
an special way of knowing our reasons for action? Well there is such dependence, but 
it seems useless for explanatory purposes, just because the reasons involved in such a 
knowledge are just what I have called CS reasons, they are just the content of our in-
tentions. Let’s compare (5) —the kind of answer that has certainly impressed David-
sonian and Humean philosophers, not Moran— with case (7), in which Moran would 
say that my knowledge of the reason because of which I act explains my knowledge of 
my intention. Against Moran, I will argue that (5) is not so different from (7) as it 
might seem. Of course, in (7) the content of the relevant intention includes the wor-
thiness of visiting the exhibition: the exhibition is going to be visited under the aspect 
of being something worth visiting. But this is something that is conversationally impli-
cated by (7) —in the same sense that the relevant intention is conversationally impli-
cated in (5)— and something that goes beyond the mere fact that the agent recognises 
the value in visiting the exhibition (plus the fact that this valuable aspect causes his go-
ing to Barcelona).  
 In (7) the speakers’ commitment to convey the relevant information about the 
purpose, about the CS Reasons, about the intention why she acts can be cancelled in 
exactly the same way as in (4-6) 
The fact that the exhibition is worth seeing caused my promise to visit my mother before the end 
of the exhibition. So I am going there to visit her.  
 (7) specifies, in a normal context, the intention with which I act. A crucial differ-
ence with the rest of the cases is that the specified intention has a normative content: I 
intend to visit the exhibition under the description of it being something worth seeing. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the fact that it is considered by me as worth vis-
iting fixes the intention. Not even the conjunction of the fact that (I believe) is worth 
seeing plus the fact that my belief on this valuable aspect causes my intention manages 
to fix my intention.  
 So, let’s agree with Moran that there is a special, immediate, non observational first 
person knowledge about our intentions, about the purposes of our action, about the 
reasons because of which we act. There is a special sense of “reason” in which any 
case of intentional action is action for reasons. And there is some special immediate, 
non observational first person knowledge about those reasons. If I am right in the 
previous paragraphs, in the only sense in which intentional action is action for rea-
sons, those reasons are just the content of the intention with which we act. Our 
knowledge of those reasons can hardly be used to explain our knowledge of our inten-
tions just because they are just the content of those intentions. And, more relevant for 
Moran overall strategy: they are not the reasons why we act because of the fact that 
they are (conceived by us) as good or bad. They are not, at least not necessarily, nor-
mative or justificatory in any interesting sense.  
 Of course, sometimes it is the fact that they are good reasons that moves me: then 
it is this goodness that it is a constitutive part of (the content) of my intention. But 
this can hardly be a universal requirement of intentional action. And it is not possible 
to derive our first personal knowledge of our intentions from certain normative fea-
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tures that we might discover in those reasons, independently of the more primitive 
fact that they are the purpose with which we act. In my opinion, there is no way in 
which the special transparency of our own intentions might be explained by our ac-
ceptance of any special feature, value, virtue of their objects, except the transparency 
of the fact that they are endorsed as our purpose-in-action. And, even if Moran mas-
terfully explores this transparency, I do not think that he provides a satisfactory expla-
nation of it.  
III 
There is a tradition of anti-Humean literature that is obsessed with the idea that a 
good argument against the Humean is the fact that we usually have reasons for our 
desires or our intentions. Moran insistence in the peculiarity of “judgement sensitive” 
or “motivated” desires is a particular case (chapter IV). As many anti-Humeans (Na-
gel, Quinn, Scanlon) he suggests that this phenomenon shows that, at least in many 
normal cases of motivation, it is quite obvious that we need reasons of the normative 
kind to have certain desires. And certainly he says that in sound pieces of practical rea-
soning our desire does not survive to the absence of those kinds of reasons:  
the presence or absence of justification makes a difference to the presence or absence of the de-
sire itself, and the direction of the desire is in fact guided by the direction of his thought about 
what is desirable. (pp. 117-8)  
 There are many crucial differences between the concept of reasons for desires and 
the concepts of reason for action. In the previous sections, I argued that it is a mistake 
to assume that there is an interesting sense of “reason” such that any case of inten-
tional action is a case of action for reasons, if they are not just CS reasons, the content 
of the intention for which we act. As I suggested there, a typical source of illusion is to 
equivocate about the meaning of standard avowals of the form “I want...”. Many 
times they are different from mere avowals of desire and they have all the marks of 
avowals of intention: for instance, in a normal context, I cannot insist that I still want 
to eat this cake now without even trying to eat it now. When Moran talks about 
“judgement sensitive desires” sometimes he seems to be thinking in “judgement sensi-
tive intentions”. For dialectical purposes I will ignore the difference that does not af-
fect the crucial point of my diagnosis: for all that Moran says, “judgement sensitive 
desires” is a way of referring to the (normal) incompleteness of (most) descriptions of 
our desires or intentions. 
 I think, then, that Moran misinterprets the phenomenon of those “judgement sen-
sitive” desires. They require, of course, a sophisticated conceptual equipment: certainly 
small babies and animals cannot have them. To adapt one’s of Moran own examples, 
if I want to learn French because I am going to live in Paris and I think that being a 
fluent French speaker will make my life there much better, my justification for my de-
sire/intention/plan to learn French and the presence of the desire/intention/plan it-
self seem to be fixed by certain future prospects in my life. It cannot survive my aban-
donment of the plan of living in Paris, when I learn that in fact I will not receive the 
expected funding. All right. Nevertheless, this is just a particular case of what I de-
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scribed before as CS reasons: to say that I want to learn French is an incomplete descrip-
tion of my attitude that is refined when I say that I want to learn French as my chosen 
way of having a happier life in Paris. I want to go to the station now, because I want 
to go to Barcelona: my going to the station is only a part of my intention. The inten-
tion is better specified by describing it as my chosen way of going to Barcelona.  
 By itself, the phenomenon of refining the description of our desires and intentions 
does not introduce any normative notion (“desirable”) at all. If my plan/intention/de-
sire of having a happy life in Paris would justify my learning French, for everything 
Moran says when he talks about “judgement sensitive” desires, my desire to kill some-
one would justify as desirable my buying an appropriate gun. This is something that, I 
guess, both Moran and me would consider as the most undesirable consequence. To 
follow this route is playing with fire: it is the first step to just reduce practical rational-
ity to a mere theoretical knowledge about the instrumental connection between certain 
means and certain ends. Something that, I am sure, Moran does not like, at all.  
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